ARCADIA FIRE DEPARTMENT
STANDARD OPERATING GUIDELINE

RESPONSE TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)

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Approved: _____
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PURPOSE

The purpose of this document is to establish clear guidelines for first responder actions in the event of a suspected terrorist incident involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). These guidelines address the role of first responders, dispatchers and command staff in mitigating the initial crisis period following a WMD incident.

PROCEDURE

Incident Management

1. All incidents or threats involving weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, biological or chemical shall be managed by a designated supervisor from the Police Department, using a Unified Command Post.

2. Emergency responders from Police, Fire, Public Works or other support units shall use the Incident Command System (ICS) in coordinating such events

3. The ranking police supervisor or commander shall direct operations pursuant to the guidelines established by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department for all Los Angeles County law enforcement agencies.

Response

1. Stage upwind

2. Personal Protective Equipment
   - Wear highest level of protection available for all suspected biological or chemical WMD events:
   - SCBA WILL protect against airborne particles (including biological agents, chemical vapors and gases)
   - Turnouts may not provide sufficient protection against high concentrations of biological or chemical agents.
   - Maintain a safe distance and call for appropriate assistance.
   - Your protective equipment may need to be decontaminated or appropriately disposed of.

3. CONSIDER SECONDARY DEVICES designed to harm First Responders, such as spraying, exploding or breaking devices, which may be concealed in a box, suitcase, or other container.

Fire Responder Actions

1. Establish Command
   - Incident Command System (ICS): Identify Incident Command Post (ICP)
   - Unified Command: Notify arriving agencies of location of ICP

2. Isolate and Deny Entry
   - Establish exclusionary (hot) zone
   - Utilize Emergency Response Guide (ERG) for suggested evacuation distances.

3. Initial approach to mass casualties
   - Avoid physical contact
   - Use megaphone or P.A. for communication
   - Direct ambulatory casualties to a safe area
   - Warn casualties of identified hazards
   - Begin decontamination (see decontamination guidelines)

4. Support Hazmat team and other personnel as they arrive

5. Initial Fire Department response shall consist of the on-duty Battalion Chief responding to the field command post to maintain liaison with the Police Incident Commander. In consultation with the Incident Commander, the Battalion Chief will determine the appropriate response for fire, paramedic and rescue units, and designate a staging area.
   - The Battalion Chief shall remain at the Command Post to ensure continuity of communication and coordinated use of resources.

Evacuations

1. Responsible officials should make the decision to evacuate only after evaluating the threat. Automatic evacuations or total evacuations of a building or area may lead to additional threats and may affect future events; the next bomb may be set up outside in anticipation of the total evacuation. Responsible officials might consider an evacuation of the building or area if the situation dictates. There are three evacuation considerations.

   No Evacuation **—** When responsible officials make a determination of no evacuation, all personnel in the area may continue with the normal routine.

   Partial Evacuation **—** When responsible officials make a determination of a partial evacuation, only essential or needed personnel remain behind to continue operations.

   Total Evacuation **—** In a total evacuation, evacuate all personnel within the building or to a designated location.

2. After responsible officials make an evacuation decision, enforce the minimum distance recommended for evacuation as suggested in the chart on the following page of this module. Once the Bomb Squad determines size of the device, consider enlarging the minimum safe distance as necessary.

3. Responders should remember that it is far easier to reduce the size of a zone of safety than it would be to expand it later.

Evacuation Distances

The evacuation chart included as Attachment A shows common devices, their explosives capacity, and associated evacuation distances for personnel located indoors and outdoors. The listed evacuation distances are consistent with the explosives capacity of the device. Lethal air-blast ranges extend to at least one-half the building evacuation distance.

1. The member in charge may give the order to have the location evacuated if they believe it is necessary.

2. Whenever a menace to the public health or safety is created by a calamity such as floor, storm, fire, earthquake, explosion, accident or other disaster, peace officers may close the area where the menace exists for the duration thereof, to any and all persons not authorized by such officer to enter or remain within the closed area.

Communications

To ensure continuity of response and action consistent with a Unified Command, all activities by police, fire and support units must be reported to the Command Post. The Command Post will authorize actions consistent with the Incident Action Plan and the needs of the incident. Clear, concise communications is imperative to the success of operations.

Threat Analysis

1. The Incident Commander or his/her designee shall consult with the person(s) in charge of the location where the threat is focused or a person(s) whose knowledge of the incident location provides the appropriate information to assess the credibility of the threat.

   <u>Credible Threat</u>
   - ☑ Clear and control the area. Treat the area as a hot zone until proven otherwise.
   - ☑ Make evacuation decisions
   - ☑ If the decision is made to evacuate, advise evacuees to take personal property such as purses, coats, brief cases, etc.
   - ☑ Designate search teams (May be police, fire and /or representatives of the targeted location) to evaluate the area.

- ☑ If a suspected explosive device is located, open doors and windows to minimize primary damage from a blast and secondary damage from fragmentation
- ☑ Do not approach a suspected device. Note location and general description. Provide this information to the Command Post.
- ☑ Do not use radios, mobile data terminals or cell phones within 1,000 feet of a suspected device. This includes radar and video transmitting equipment
- ☑ Obtain assistance:
  - Sheriff's Bomb Squad
  - LA County Health Hazmat
  - Area C Haz-Mat response
  - Mutual Aid request LA County Fire Hazmat if necessary
  - FBI
  - Alcohol Tobacco and Explosives (ATF)

Non-Credible Threat

- ☑ When consultation with the responsible person(s) of the location and the totality of the circumstances leads the police supervisor and FBI to believe the threat is not credible, the emergency services response may be discontinued.

- ☑ In the absence of any credible evidence suggesting a valid threat, the responsible person must be advised that the decision to close a business, evacuate the premises or remain open rests solely with them (responsible party)

Triage and Treatment

1. Assign Multi Casualty Branch ICS positions:

2. Medical Group Supervisor

3. Triage Unit Supervisor

4. Treatment Unit Supervisor

5. Transport Group Supervisor

Self-Treatment for nerve agent exposure

1. Recognize early symptoms of exposure: Don't panic
   - Heavy salivation (drooling)
   - Lacrimation (tearing)
   - Rhinorrhea (runny nose)
   - Shortness of breath
   - Nausea

2. Administer Duo Dote auto injector antidotes

3. Proceed to Mass Decontamination Corridor

4. Proceed to Triage Unit after decontamination

Documentation

1. Observations
2. Scene size-up
3. Evidence
4. Signs and symptoms of victims
5. Number of victims
6. Actions taken
7. Number of people transported
8. Tests conducted
   - Type of test
   - Who conducted it
   - Results

Attachment A

	Threat Description		Explosives Mass[1] (TNT equivalent)	Building Evacuation Distance[2]	Outdoor Evacuation Distance[3]
High Explosives (TNT Equivalent)		Pipe Bomb	5 lbs 2.3 kg	70 ft 21 m	850 ft 259 m
		Suicide Belt	10 lbs 4.5 kg	90 ft 27 m	1,080 ft 330 m
		Suicide Vest	20 lbs 9 kg	110 ft 34 m	1,360 ft 415 m
		Briefcase/Suitcase Bomb	50 lbs 23 kg	150 ft 46 m	1,850 ft 564 m
		Compact Sedan	500 lbs 227 kg	320 ft 98 m	1,500 ft 457 m
		Sedan	1,000 lbs 454 kg	400 ft 122 m	1,750 ft 534 m
		Passenger/Cargo Van	4,000 lbs 1,814 kg	640 ft 195 m	2,750 ft 838 m
		Small Moving Van/ Delivery Truck	10,000 lbs 4,536 kg	860 ft 263 m	3,750 ft 1,143 m
		Moving Van/Water Truck	30,000 lbs 13,608 kg	1,240 ft 375 m	6,500 ft 1,982 m
		Semitrailer	60,000 lbs 27,216 kg	1,570 ft 475 m	7,000 ft 2,134 m
	Threat Description		**LPG Mass/Volume[1]**	**Fireball Diameter[4]**	**Safe Distance[5]**
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG - Butane or Propane)		Small LPG Tank	20 lbs/5 gal 9 kg/19 l	40 ft 12 m	160 ft 48 m
		Large LPG Tank	100 lbs/25 gal 45 kg/95 l	69 ft 21 m	276 ft 84 m
		Commercial/Residential LPG Tank	2,000 lbs/500 gal 907 kg/1,893 l	184 ft 56 m	736 ft 224 m
		Small LPG Truck	8,000 lbs/2,000 gal 3,630 kg/7,570 l	292 ft 89 m	1,168 ft 356 m
		Semitanker LPG	40,000 lbs/10,000 gal 18,144 kg/37,850 l	499 ft 152 m	1,996 ft 608 m

[1] Based on the maximum amount of material that could reasonably fit into a container or vehicle. Variations possible.
[2] Governed by the ability of an unreinforced building to withstand severe damage or collapse.
[3] Governed by the greater of fragment throw distance or glass breakage/falling glass hazard distance. These distances can be reduced for personnel wearing ballistic protection. Note that the pipe bomb, suicide belt/vest, and briefcase/suitcase bomb are assumed to have a fragmentation characteristic that requires greater standoff distances than an equal amount of explosives in a vehicle.
[4] Assuming efficient mixing of the flammable gas with ambient air.
[5] Determined by U.S. firefighting practices wherein safe distances are approximately 4 times the flame height. Note that an LPG tank filled with high explosives would require a significantly greater standoff distance than if it were filled with LPG.